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Summary 
The photovoltaic solar panels on the International Space 
Station (ISS) track the Sun through continuous rotating motion 
enabled by large bearings on the main truss called solar array 
alpha rotary joints (SARJs). In late 2007, shortly after 
installation, the starboard SARJ had become hard to turn and 
had to be shut down after exceeding drive current safety 
limits. The port SARJ, of the same design, had been working 
well for over 2 years. An exhaustive failure investigation 
ensued that included multiple extravehicular activities to 
collect information and samples for engineering forensics, 
detailed structural and thermal analyses, and a careful review 
of the build records. The ultimate root cause was determined 
to be kinematic design vulnerability coupled with inadequate 
lubrication, and manufacturing flaws; this was corroborated 
through ground tests, metallurgical studies, and modeling. A 
highly successful recovery plan was developed and 
implemented that included replacing worn and damaged 
components in orbit and applying space-compatible grease to 
improve lubrication. Beyond the technical aspects, however, 
lie several key programmatic lessons learned. These lessons, 
such as running ground tests to intentional failure to 
experimentally verify failure modes, are reviewed and 
discussed so they can be applied to future projects to avoid 
such problems. 
Introduction  
The International Space Station (ISS), shown in Figure 1, 
bears a slight resemblance to a dragonfly such that it consists 
of a long, slender but strong truss structure from which large 
wings and other key components are attached. Among the 
most critical of these are two solar array wings (port and 
starboard sides) made up of numerous photovoltaic (PV) 
panels that convert sunlight directly into electricity to power 
the Station.  
To maximize generated power, the PV panels slowly rotate 
through 360 as the ISS orbits the Earth to keep the panels 
pointed towards the Sun during the ISS “day.” Specially 
designed bearings and drive mechanisms, aptly named “solar 
array alpha rotary joints,” or SARJs, are built into the ISS 
backbone truss adjacent to each PV wing to allow the panels 
to track the sunlight while the rest of the Station remains 
facing the surface of the Earth as seen in Figure 2. 
The SARJs are shown schematically in Figure 3 and loosely 
resemble a pair of steel hula hoops, nearly 10 ft in diameter, 
that are arranged side by side and linked by a dozen arms, 
called trundle arms, placed at regular 30 intervals around the 
circumference. Each trundle arm has a clamp (i.e., gorilla 
mount, or gorilla clamp) on one end to grasp one hula hoop 
(race ring) and a fixture on the other end containing three 
opposing rollers that surround the cross section of the other 
hula hoop, allowing it to roll freely.  
Unlike hula hoops, which are hollow, made from flimsy 
plastic, and have a round cross section, the SARJ race rings 
have a triangular cross section and are made from hard-coated 
stainless steel. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show more closeup details of 
the SARJ race arrangement, the trundle arms, and the rollers. 
SARJ Operational Requirements 
Whereas this over-simplified description of the SARJ does 
allow a macroscopic understanding of its operation and 
purpose, the engineering implementation is anything but 
simple. The SARJs must accomplish a number of unique tasks 
and exhibit characteristics that challenge many facets of 
engineering design and operation. These requirements are 
reviewed below. The SARJs are unusual mechanisms and are 
essentially the first of their kind to have been designed and 
implemented. This aspect must be kept in mind when reading 
the remainder of this paper to temper the tendency to question 
why design flaws were overlooked or the inevitable failure 
was not foreseen. 
The ISS is an orbiting research laboratory designed to 
house astronauts, laboratory and living space, experiments, 
and life support systems. Its purpose is to enable experiments 
in a zero-gravity (microgravity) environment and to conduct 
observational studies of the Earth and space (Ref. 1). Also, the 
ISS is an ideal engineering testbed for life support and other 
systems that are needed for future long-term space 
exploration. To ensure a safe, vibration free, and robust 
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environment, the ISS structure must be strong and stiff while 
simultaneously allowing for physical expansion and re-
arrangement, in-space component replacement, and 
operational redundancy on key and critical elements such as 
power generation (e.g., replaceable battery packs) and cooling. 
In addition, all systems on the ISS must be long lived (a 30-
year maintenance-free design life is the goal), require minimal 
power, and not create contamination (i.e., out-gassing and 
debris generation) and be tolerant of degradation by radiation, 
micrometeorite impact, and atomic oxygen. All of these 
requirements are also constrained by the payload size and 
mass limitations of the space shuttle cargo bays in which ISS 
components were launched into orbit. 
With respect to the SARJs, the ISS operational 
requirements led to many of the resulting design features. For 
instance, the SARJ construction materials consist of hardened 
stainless steels, vacuum-compatible greases and bearings, and 
the use of bolts and fittings with capture features to prevent 
the loss of parts during extravehicular activity (EVA) 
assembly and replacement. To yield a long rolling-contact 
fatigue life, the race rings are nitride-treated to present a hard 
ceramic surface to the hardened stainless steel bearing rollers. 
Each component that makes up the SARJs is carefully 
engineered to carry the loads with adequate margins at 
minimum overall mass while maintaining extreme levels of 
precision alignment and accuracy. The SARJ trundle arms are 
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fully replaceable by a suited astronaut, one arm at a time, and 
can be configured to allow either race ring to be stationary or 
free to rotate. These clever design features ensure the 
redundancy of the race ring should one wear out or fail 
without necessitating the breaking of the ISS backbone truss—
a very risky endeavor. Lastly, care had been taken at every 
step to minimize friction. In fact, rotating each SARJ on the 
ISS required less electricity than a standard reading light 
(~30 W). In short, the ISS SARJs are a true engineering 
marvel. 
The SARJ Design, Build, and Test 
Sequence 
The SARJ conceptual design began in the mid-1980s when 
NASA began to solicit ideas that might guide the overall 
layout and operation of an operating space laboratory intended 
for a 30-year lifespan in near-Earth orbit. With respect to 
mechanical elements of the ISS, two highly relevant reference 
papers written at the time provide insight into this period and 
the eventual SARJ design (Refs. 2 and 3). While these papers 
are helpful in understanding the genesis of the SARJ, it is 
important to point out that no single comprehensive document 
exists that explains the overall SARJ design, how it functions, 
and how it was built. This lack of a single source of 
information available to all who contributed to the SARJ is 
possibly the single most likely culprit for the failure. 
Nonetheless, when taken together the following two papers do 
help one understand the SARJ. 
The first paper discusses the challenges of selecting 
lubricants and materials for bearings, gears, and mechanisms 
that must cope with the aggressive low-Earth-orbit (LEO) 
space environment and yet permit long life with no chance of 
contamination of sensitive ISS systems (Ref. 2). For example, 
hydrocarbon-based greases and Teflon, silver, and lead solid 
lubricants are often used in spacecraft, but these were deemed 
unacceptable on the ISS. Hydrocarbon greases vaporize over 
long times and tend to become too thick and stiff at the 
subzero temperatures anticipated for the mechanisms external 
to the ISS during the orbital night. Traditional solid lubricants 
are ravaged by atomic oxygen. The paper does suggest that if 
the engineering need arises to use such materials, then a full-
duration life test should be done before launch.  
With regards to friction and lubrication of mechanisms, the 
following generalization can be safely made: 
 
Rolling is better than sliding, oils and 
greases are better than solid lubricants, and 
traditional solid lubricants (e.g., molyb-
denum disulfide, polytetrafluoro-ethylene 
(PTFE), and engineered and intercalated 
graphite) are better at reducing friction than 
metal films.  
 
As an example of this generalization, one can consider the 
simple case of a wheel or roller moving along a plane. If the 
wheel or roller moves along a flat surface in rolling contact the 
friction is very small. If one divides the rolling component of 
the friction force by the contact load, the rolling friction 
coefficient is determined. This condition is termed “pure 
rolling,” and rolling friction coefficients for hard contacting 
surfaces are very low, typically less than 0.01. However, if the 
same roller is dragged along a surface, high friction results, 
and the value depends upon the materials present at the sliding 
interface. When two hard surfaces rub, friction coefficients 
between 0.5 and possibly over 1.0 are common because 
sliding is accomplished by physical shearing of materials and 
atoms at the moving interface. If a soft lubricant material with 
low shear strength is intentionally placed between two hard 
sliding bodies, friction is greatly reduced. Lubricants such as 
oil, grease, and molybdenum disulfide and graphite 
composites, when properly engineered for vacuum, yield 
sliding friction coefficients typically around 0.1, whereas more 
chemically stable solid lubricants like lead, silver, and gold 
coatings exhibit coefficients between 0.2 and 0.3. This type of 
general understanding drives the design of new space 
mechanisms like the SARJ. As a design approach it is sound, 
but there remain many uncertainties that must always be 
proven through rigorous testing. 
Unfortunately, during the initial phase of the ISS program, 
sufficient time was not available nor were there sufficient 
financial resources for life (30-yr) testing. Further, no widely 
accepted accelerated life test existed then (or even today) to 
confirm a selected lubrication approach. The paper does 
conclude that vacuum-compatible greases based upon 
fluorocarbons may be viable inside sealed bearings and noble 
soft metals such as thin gold films might be suitable for 
contacting surfaces exposed to the space environment. 
Interestingly, these suggestions were adopted in the SARJ 
design.  
The second highly relevant publication, written by NASA 
Lewis Research Center (former name of the NASA Glenn 
Research Center) mechanical components division personnel, 
describes conceptual design approaches for large rotating 
joints used for pointing solar arrays on orbiting spacecraft 
(Ref. 3). This report presents the idea of using side-by-side 
rings joined by triangularly opposing pinch rollers is 
presented. The virtues of this design approach such as built-in 
redundancy, structural rigidity, and low mass are highlighted. 
Interestingly, the design approach included using the trundle 
rollers as traction drives to further reduce complexity and 
mass by eliminating large, exposed drive gears and dedicated 
drive-lock assemblies as was ultimately engineered for the ISS 
SARJs. One engineering aspect the reader takes from this and 
the lubricant materials paper addressed previously is that there 
were many possible designs and material choices available to 
achieve the overall mechanism performance goals.  
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In the absence of deep previous experience with space 
mechanisms similar to the SARJs, 
 
The best possible design could only have 
been determined through an extensive 
research and development program since 
such a mechanism—the SARJ—was a first 
of its kind. 
 
The SARJ design appears to have been loosely based upon 
these two key reports and evolved over a 3-yr period between 
1987 and 1990, at which time subcomponent hardware was 
built and tested by a number of different prime contractors, 
subcontractors, and vendors. Based upon a 30-yr design life 
criterion, the failure potential for the SARJ was broken down 
into categories based upon presumed failure modes such as 
thermal-mechanical effects including thermally induced 
pinching and interference, load-induced stress-type failure, 
unintentional foreign object damage (FOD) contamination, 
and micrometeorite damage. For the moving assemblies such 
as the internal roller bearings and the contacting roller-race 
ring surfaces, classical rolling-contact fatigue was considered 
the dominant potential failure mode. The vital internal roller 
bearings were sealed and well lubricated with vacuum-
compatible grease and were fit with backup bearing surfaces 
and health-monitoring indicators. With such well understood 
and efficient lubrication, their life expectancy far outpaced 
that of the station. Since the critical contact between the rollers 
and the race ring surfaces were carefully designed for pure 
rolling contact, the need for lubrication appears to have not 
been deemed critical and was not specifically considered as a 
test variable. 
Overall, the SARJ design is impressive. Great care was 
taken to ensure nearly perfect rolling contact between the 
trundle rollers and the race ring surfaces. Precision-tapered 
roller bearings with specifically measured grease volumes and 
carefully set and recorded preloads were used inside each 
trundle roller. The drag torque for each roller was repeatedly 
measured and recorded, as was the drag of assembled trundles. 
Every effort was made to ensure that all the trundles were 
manufactured employing the same techniques and yielded 
reproducibly low drag. Detailed lab notes, data records, and 
photographs were made of the entire SARJ mechanism at 
every step (Ref. 4). 
The final design included a special nitride treatment for the 
race rings that deposited a near-diamond-hard iron nitride 
coating in all locations that would undergo trundle roller 
contact. With this approach, the anticipated rolling-contact 
fatigue life was estimated to be literally hundreds of years of 
ISS operation. Additionally, thin films of gold were deposited 
onto the trundle roller surfaces for solid lubrication, though it 
was not clear that this function was widely understood. 
Figure 7 shows a photograph of a finished trundle assembly 
(port SARJ) in which the gold-plated rollers are clearly visible. 
Although Reference 1 clearly indicates that gold is used for 
lubrication, Reference 2 suggests that gold films serve a 
slightly different function: helping to maintain a smooth  
 
 
 
contact surface, needed to ensure a low-vibration bearing. One 
contacting surface that was left unlubricated, despite 
significant sliding, was the drive gear for the race ring. 
Concerns regarding the potential for gear wear led to a special 
full system-level, accelerated test to ensure adequate gear life. 
This system test, aptly named the pinion gear life test, was 
conducted on the structural test article (STA), one of the three 
SARJs built. 
The STA was the first SARJ built and was used to validate 
the general design. It was also used to measure joint stiffness 
and dynamic characteristics needed by the ISS structural team 
tasked with providing a low-gravity research environment for 
the ISS. Following the initial characterization tests, the 
accelerated pinion gear life test was performed. This test was 
conducted in open air, not vacuum, and it was run at a rotation 
rate about 40 times faster than nominal speed to reduce test 
time. No real-speed life test, in vacuum, was run for the SARJ; 
many may have felt at the time that the pinion test of the STA 
represented an adequate life test. For the SARJ, a combination 
of redundant design features and calculations were used to 
ensure that adequate design margins existed for anticipated 
failure modes. For the critical trundle roller-race surface 
contact, the expected failure mode was rolling-contact fatigue. 
Because of this, when questions related to build anomalies and 
their affect on performance and life arose, the expected failure 
modes were used as the relevant yardstick. 
Subsequently, the two flight joints were built: first the port 
SARJ and then the starboard SARJ. The build records show 
that the sequence of events encountered during the builds was 
similar in many respects yet different in others. This is 
unsurprising for projects involving major undertakings of 
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precision hardware. Following assembly of the port SARJ, it 
was functionally tested and found to give performance, with 
respect to drive torque, akin to the STA. The starboard SARJ 
was built and assembled about 6 months after the port and 
then functionally tested in the same manner as the port SARJ. 
Although both joints exhibited similar stiffness characteristics, 
the starboard SARJ differed in one key aspect: Its drive 
current, an indicator of drag torque, was about 30 percent 
higher than both the STA and port SARJs. 
The higher-than-expected starboard drive current caused 
considerable concern amongst the project team. All three 
joints had been carefully designed and built, and each 
subassembly had been tested for drag and performance. A 
review of the build records at that time showed that the 
components used in the starboard SARJ had nominally the 
same drag and misalignment as the STA and port SARJs’ 
components. Since the overall torque had been calculated as 
the sum of the drag torque of the components, the discrepancy 
was unexpected. Despite considerable investigations, no 
specific reason for the higher drag torque on the starboard 
SARJ was determined. Since the starboard SARJ drive current 
levels were still well within the limits initially set for the 
project, the matter was dropped and attributed to simply a 
normal variation for a SARJ. 
The SARJ Launch and Operation 
The port SARJ was launched early in 2006 and began regular 
operation in September of that year. Its behavior was closely 
monitored and found to be nominal, largely mirroring the 
behavior observed during ground tests. The starboard SARJ was 
launched in the spring of 2007 and began rotation in June of 
2007. By September, after just 3 months of operation, engineers 
detected changes in the starboard SARJ performance. After 5 
weeks of investigation, engineers had been able to eliminate 
many of the probable electronic and control contributors, thus 
zeroing in on mechanical problems. During this period of 
investigation the drive current fluctuations grew to unacceptable 
levels, prompting the shutting down of the starboard SARJ 
rotation in October. Although the drive system had adequate 
capacity for rotation, even at these increased torque levels, there 
was serious concern that the SARJ might become stalled. 
Several short-duration joint movement tests were conducted to 
study the problem, and it was deduced that increased drag 
torque was directly causing the observed current draw 
fluctuations. With this information as a backdrop, a full-scale 
investigation was begun.  
SARJ Investigation 
The investigative team was far reaching and included 
representatives from space operations, the prime contractors 
and subcontractors who built the SARJ, research engineers, 
analysts, and specialists in root-cause investigation processes. 
Information regarding the hardware as well as fabrication and 
 
 
 
testing history along with the on-orbit performance was 
uploaded onto a shared documents site and made available to 
all of the root-cause team members. Selected team personnel 
served as liaisons to mission operations personnel to offer 
input for space walks (EVAs) that were planned to collect 
more information about the failed joint. 
The first EVA, conducted in late November 2007, was 
initiated to seek obvious causes for SARJ distress. The 
astronauts were instructed to examine the SARJ multilayer 
insulation and cover panels for signs of micrometeorite 
damage and to seek any mechanical interference from nearby 
hardware such as hold-down brackets and deployment 
mechanisms. In short, the EVA goal was to look for a 
“smoking gun” that would explain the anomalous behavior of 
the starboard SARJ (Ref. 5). The astronauts found nothing off-
nominal during the external examination. When they removed 
one cover to inspect the internal mechanisms they 
immediately noticed damage to one surface of the rotating 
race ring and copious amounts of wear debris near and around 
the damaged race as well as adhered to the trundle bearings 
(see Fig. 8).  
Samples of the debris were collected and returned to Earth 
for analysis. While the root cause for the race damage was not 
yet known, it was apparent that the roughened surface was 
likely the reason for the increased drag torque and the rough 
nature of the joint operation. A followup inspection of the port 
SARJ showed no such damage. The port SARJ appeared in 
pristine condition (see Fig. 9).  
Closer examination of the damaged starboard SARJ 
components was accomplished through additional spacewalks 
and extensive photographic surveys. The wear debris analysis 
showed that the debris was made up predominantly of 
fractured pieces of the hardened nitride surface of the race 
ring. Little debris from the 440C stainless steel rollers was 
present. The lack of any circumferential scratches, grooves, or 
wear marks on the race surface suggested that all of the rollers 
were indeed rolling. Further, rolling sensors integrated into 
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each roller verified that none of the Timken-style (tapered 
roller) internal bearings used inside each roller had failed. The 
surface appeared to have been damaged by the intended 
rolling action of the SARJ design. To get a better picture of 
what may have occurred, a careful review of the build records 
ensued.  
The build records, amassed over nearly a decade, were 
immense (Ref. 4). The SARJs (port and starboard) are 
carefully described by over 3000 pages containing detailed 
build records, photographs, and performance graphs. Many of 
these records had been scanned and digitized with the 
exception of some fax communications amongst contractors 
and photographs taken with 35-mm cameras of subassembly 
components. 
The build record review was intriguing. In one respect, the 
review revealed that the SARJ was built with extreme 
precision and care. Each and every part, subassembly and 
assembly, was identified with unique serial numbers that were 
tracked and recorded. Every tapered roller bearing installed 
inside every roller was characterized for preload and drag 
torque. Even the amount of grease used for each bearing was 
metered, weighed, and recorded to assure uniform drag. The 
review also definitively proved that no parts were installed 
incorrectly, out of place, or out of sequence. The review also 
highlighted that in some instances key parts were made to 
less-than-optimum precision. When this happened, documen-
tation supported either acceptance as built, reworking to meet 
specifications, or rejection and replacement. During the 
investigation, the build records concerning the failed SARJ 
were scrutinized, especially those documents related to the 
damaged contact surfaces, the race ring, and the trundle 
bearing roller assemblies. 
It was discovered, for instance, that the heat treatment and 
nitriding of the race rings differed slightly between the 
functioning port SARJ and failed starboard SARJ. The 
differences, however, were judged to be of secondary 
importance at the time because the nitride treatment was 
believed to be an enhancement of the base metal. The primary 
requirement for the nitride layer was good adhesion and 
proper thickness, and the casual metallography conducted 
during the build showed that both races were acceptable. More 
recent and in-depth metallurgical analysis of those witness 
coupons showed that the failed SARJ race ring contained more 
subsurface flaws than the port ring. Under severe loads, well 
beyond design limits, it could be expected that the increased 
incidence of subsurface flaws could lead to surface failure. 
Ultimately, the higher level of flaws found in the starboard 
SARJ race ring were deemed a contributing factor to its failure 
but were not the primary root cause. 
The other components that received scrutiny during the 
record review were the trundle rollers, particularly the smaller 
upper rollers that operate against the canted race surfaces of 
the race ring. These rollers, pointed out in Figure 4, are 
specified to be made from hardened 440C stainless bearing 
steel, precision ground and then plated with a thin layer of 
gold. The build records indicate that the batch of rollers used 
for the starboard side were initially defective, in that the 
contacting surface (roller outside diameter) did not meet 
straightness requirements. To address this shortcoming, the 
rollers were hand-polished until the profiles were within 
specifications.  
Communications and documentation reports were located 
that suggest that there were discussions amongst the 
subcontractors regarding the suitability of reworking the parts. 
Technical input from engineering suggests that the impact of 
less-than-optimum rolling surface geometry was assessed 
based upon the prevailing SARJ operational understanding 
that classical, long-term rolling-contact fatigue was the 
mechanical failure mode of concern. Since modeling 
suggested at least an order-of-magnitude fatigue life margins 
existed for the SARJ, a slightly wavy profile, as long as it was 
within specifications, would not impact mission life. 
Following roller finishing, they were plated with a thin 
(1- to 2-m-thick) gold film. Like the nitride treatment, it 
appears that the lubrication function of the gold film was for 
enhancement. The contact between the rollers and the race 
ring is designed to be as near to pure rolling contact as 
possible. The build records do not describe the purpose of gold 
as a lubricant. The aforementioned joint design paper (Ref. 3) 
suggests that such films provide a smooth running surface and 
prevent undesirable low friction levels that can cause slippage 
when rollers are used to provide driving or braking torque, a 
scenario significantly different from the SARJ. Whatever the 
design intent of the gold film, its condition offered important  
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clues to the SARJ failure. Figure 10 shows a photograph of an 
assembled roller from the port SARJ buildup in which the 
gold film is in its intended pristine state.  
In operation, the gold gradually wears out and transfers to 
the nitrided race ring surface where it helps to lower friction. 
Figure 11 shows an assembled roller from the failed starboard 
SARJ in which the gold film is clearly deficient.  
This image, similar to those of a majority of the starboard 
SARJ rollers, shows that the gold layer did not properly 
adhere to the roller surface. As with the out-of-specification 
roller profiles condition, the peeling gold was the subject of 
several fax communications between subcontractors. Because 
the role of the gold was not understood, the impact of its poor 
condition was not known. Prevailing thinking was that it  
 
 
 
would have little impact on the fatigue life of the SARJ and 
that if it affected performance in a negative fashion, this would 
reveal itself during prelaunch ground testing. From a scientific 
standpoint, it is well understood that the presence or absence 
of the gold film would have little effect on rolling friction but 
a significant effect on sliding friction at the roller-raceway 
contacts. 
These effects are best described and quantified by the 
traction tests conducted at NASA Glenn in the vacuum roller 
rig (VRR). The VRR test loads two cylindrical rollers 
(Fig. 12) on one another and simulates the contact between the 
SARJ rollers and the race ring (Ref. 6). As shown in 
Figure 13, the motor turns the upper roller. The lower roller is 
driven by the rotation of the upper roller through the small 
contact that forms between the rollers under load.  
With this configuration, one can mimic the SARJ contact, 
in which small amounts of roller misalignment (less than 1) 
are inevitable because of tolerance stackups and 
manufacturing errors (Ref. 5). In essence, the contact is mostly 
pure rolling with a small sliding component. A key feature of 
this test is that the rotational axes of the rollers can be parallel 
(pure rolling) or intentionally misaligned resulting in small but 
controlled amounts of sliding. The roller supports are well 
instrumented, and all of the forces and torques that arise from 
the contact (axial thrust forces and radial side forces) are 
measured. 
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When misaligned rollers contact, the contact conditions can 
be very complex. The contact area resembles a line for light 
loads, and this grows to be an ellipse as load increases. 
Additionally, because the contacting materials are elastic, any 
point away from the center of contact can experience elastic 
deformation, rolling, sliding, or a combination of these effects. 
Such contact mechanics nuances have been modeled and 
studied extensively and can be very complex. However, their 
external affects can be simplified (Refs. 7 and 8).  
When misaligned rollers contact, an axial thrust force (side 
load) arises at the contact interface perpendicular to the 
direction of rolling. The magnitude of this side load depends 
upon the misalignment angle and the rigidity or elasticity of 
the materials in contact. For extreme cases of misalignment 
the side load is approximately equal to the contact load 
multiplied by the coefficient of friction for pure sliding. This 
effect can be described by the so-called traction curve that 
plots the side load as a function of misalignment angle. 
Figure 14 shows typical data produced by the VRR. 
Such contact phenomena are well understood by those well 
versed in contact mechanics, such as bearing and gear 
designers and those involved in tire mechanics. For instance, 
Figure 15 shows the side load, sometimes referred to as the 
steering force, for a car tire rolling at varying slip (steer) 
angles.  
This figure resembles closely the VRR traction curve 
except that much higher misalignment angles are required to 
achieve high levels of side load. This is because rubber tires 
are very elastic and lack rigidity. For the materials used in the 
SARJ, small misalignment angles result in high side loads.  
Because of the particular kinematic design of the SARJ 
trundle assemblies, the side load leads to a potentially 
damaging condition, depicted in Figure 16 and reported upon 
previously, namely roller tipping (Ref. 5). The rollers are 
mounted on camber pivot mechanisms with the intent to 
ensure flat contact with the race ring surfaces. Under certain 
conditions the side load is of sufficient magnitude to tip the 
roller towards its edge. 
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Such tipping results in high, localized stresses that could 
damage the contacting surfaces. Based upon detailed 
modeling, when the sliding friction coefficient between the 
roller and race ring reaches 0.4, tipping can occur (Ref. 5).  
Figure 17 shows the traction curves for SARJ-like materials 
as a function of misalignment angle. When lubricants such as 
gold or grease are present, a maximum friction (traction) 
coefficient (side load divided by normal load) of about 0.2 is 
reached at misalignments of about 1.0. (For the SARJ, 
measurements have confirmed that misalignments were 
typically less than 0.5). Beyond this point, gross slip inside 
the contact region prevents higher coefficients and 
commensurately higher side loads. In other words, good 
lubrication minimizes the effect. For the unlubricated case, 
side loads rapidly build, reaching a maximum at an effective 
friction (traction) coefficient of about 0.6, well above the level 
that causes roller tipping. Roller tipping alone leads to very 
high stresses because the load is concentrated. A second but 
critical aspect of the trundle kinematic design greatly 
exacerbates the problem, and that is unexpected rigidity of the 
trundle preload system. 
As shown in Figure 18, each trundle roller is held by its 
own pivot support. The inner 45 roller is additionally backed 
by a spring preload system that ensures that the load between 
the rollers and the race ring are maintained within limits. 
Should mechanical or thermal distortions occur within a 
trundle, for instance a large particle or other foreign object on 
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the race ring being rolled over, the spring preload of the lower 
roller can accommodate race deflection. In effect, all three 
rollers are designed to be spring preloaded by the single spring 
pack located behind the inner 45 roller.  
This same design principle is used in single piston-type 
automotive hydraulic disk brake calipers. In such mechanisms, 
the hydraulic braking pressure needs only to act upon one pad. 
Equal and opposite reaction forces are transferred to the 
opposing pad via the sliding action of the caliper. There are 
situations, however, in which load sharing does not occur. In 
such designs, load sharing is dependent upon low friction in 
the sliding mechanism used to transfer force to the opposing 
pad. Should this sliding contact experience high friction, load 
is not shared.  
In the SARJ, if the sliding friction coefficient between the 
rollers and the race surface exceeds about 0.4 the ring can be 
locked into place much the same way plier jaws lock onto a 
small, unlubricated round piece of pipe. If some lubricant is 
applied (low friction) or the pipe diameter is sufficiently large 
enough to change the jaw angle, the pliers spit the pipe away. 
In the SARJ, the lack of adequate roller-race surface 
lubrication (high friction) allowed the outer 45 roller (top right 
in the figure) to tip against the lower roller (bottom roller in 
figure) effectively pinching the race ring. This race-ring 
pinching action combined with a lack of structural compliance 
caused by high friction, led to greatly increased loads resulting 
in damaging the nitride surface. Based upon this information, 
additional modeling, and experimental verification tests, a 
failure scenario was developed and adopted. It is summarized 
as follows:  
Inadequate lubrication of the roller-race 
contact combined with a kinematic 
mechanism design vulnerable to roller 
tipping and high friction led to damaging 
high roller-race surface forces and stresses.  
 
This failure scenario provided invaluable guidance to 
recovery efforts. For instance, the scenario helped explain why 
the port SARJ that had better lubrication appeared to function 
nominally while the inadequately lubricated starboard SARJ 
failed so rapidly. The scenario also enabled modeling and 
testing efforts to corroborate various pathways to prevent port 
SARJ failure and to get the starboard side functioning. A clear 
path for better design of future SARJ-like systems is also 
revealed. Design elements could include (1) kinematic 
geometries that will not tip, even in the presence of excessive 
friction and (2) through the profiling of roller edges to avoid 
stress concentrations. 
SARJ On-Orbit Repair and Recovery 
Following the development of the root-cause failure 
scenario, an on-orbit repair and recovery plan was developed. 
This plan included an ambitious series of spacewalks to 
replace damaged trundle arms, the removal of wear debris, and 
the addition of space-compatible grease to reduce race-roller 
friction to levels well below those that lead to roller tipping. 
Design changes to the trundles and race rings could not be 
reasonably accommodated because of cost, schedule, and 
practicality reasons. 
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Figures 19 and 20 show highlights of the SARJ repair and 
some of the specialized tools used to carry out the tasks. As a 
testimony to the design team, the SARJ design did allow safe 
component replacement. In addition, the functioning port 
SARJ was also lubricated with grease, as there was a concern 
that several rollers may have had gold film adhesion problems.  
It was later determined that there is a corrosion-driven 
aging effect for gold films deposited on stainless steel. When 
exposed to room air, gold films will delaminate because of 
galvanic corrosion at the interface. Since the port SARJ rollers 
were assembled immediately after gold deposition, they 
suffered less delamination than the starboard SARJ rollers that 
sat for several months after deposition prior to assembly. 
Interestingly, when the SARJs were restarted after the 
application of grease, their overall drag torque levels 
noticeably dropped (see Fig. 21). 
This drop was somewhat unexpected because the addition 
of an extensive layer of grease was thought to be capable of 
actually increasing drag. Further, a SARJ drag-torque analysis 
conducted by the original design team had concluded that 
roller-race sliding friction had no significant effect on overall 
joint drag-torque (Ref. 9). To better understand this contra-
diction, the original torque analysis was examined. 
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SARJ Torque Analysis 
One performance aspect that was addressed during the 
design and build phase of the project was the anticipated drive 
torque and power required to rotate the SARJs. Correctly 
assessing such a parameter was vital in terms of ISS power 
management since the electrical system and its capacity have 
direct influence on many vital ISS systems, such as life 
support, cooling, and research. The SARJ prime contractor did 
a SARJ drive torque assessment study (Ref. 9).  
The study was based upon a first-principles free-body force 
analysis that took into account roller preload effects, friction 
between the rollers and the race ring, truss-induced loads, and 
friction coming from the internal greased tapered roller 
bearings found inside each trundle roller that enable their free 
rotation. The in-depth torque study was made available as an 
internal document and is part of the SARJ records.  
The SARJ torque study correctly deduced that the drag 
torque would arise from several sources: the drive motor gears 
and bearings, the rolling contact between the trundle rollers 
and the race rings, and the tapered roller bearings found inside 
each trundle roller. The drive motor assemblies and the 
tapered roller bearing friction torques are well understood by 
engineers. The drag torque of a roller on a race ring is not so 
straightforward. Figure 22(a) depicts a roller loaded against a 
race ring surface with a small amount of misalignment. The 
intentional normal load between the roller and the ring is 
applied by the spring preload system. This normal load 
interacts with the rest of the mechanical system causing 
several other forces to arise.  
One key force, the lateral or side force, arises from elastic 
effects in the contact between the roller and the race surface. 
For high levels of sliding friction and moderate misalignment 
angles, the lateral force can reach significant levels, which 
places an additional load on the internal tapered roller 
bearings, increasing their drag torque. For the SARJ, this 
means that a poorly lubricated roller-race ring contact 
combined with unavoidable misalignment will result in 
increased overall drag torque. The failure to account for the 
side load effect on bearing drag led to an incorrect conclusion 
that roller-race friction (lubrication condition) had no effect on 
overall SARJ torque, as shown in an excerpt from the original 
torque study (Ref. 9) reproduced in Figure 22(b). 
It is not surprising that a loads engineer or analyst would 
overlook such contact mechanics phenomena. Only those well 
versed in mechanical systems that include rolling contact of 
hard bodies, such as railroad or bearing specialists, would be 
intimately familiar with these forces (Refs. 7, 8, and 10). 
Because of the subtle nature of these contact mechanics, the 
fact that SARJ drag is indeed affected by roller-race 
lubrication was not known. During prelaunch ground tests, 
starboard SARJ drag torque was higher than expected by a 
factor of about 30 percent. Despite investigating the issue and 
careful review of subassembly drag values no definitive 
reason for the high “out-of-family” torque was determined. 
Because sufficient drive torque margins existed the SARJ was 
prepared for launch. 
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Lessons Learned 
Complex projects with ambitious and novel goals such as 
building a SARJ bring challenges in three primary categories: 
engineering, communications, and validation. Engineers are 
often well equipped to handle engineering challenges. Meeting 
challenges in communications and validation can prove more 
difficult because such topics are less concrete. It is with regard 
to these two categories, communications and validation, where 
important lessons learned from the SARJ failure can be gleaned.  
When orchestrating large projects involving many people 
over long periods of time, it can be difficult to maintain 
effective communications. One important risk often 
overlooked by those intimately involved with a project or 
program is ensuring that a clear, consistent, and complete 
description of the project is developed and maintained for all 
participants to use for reference. This description can take 
many forms such as a written document or a briefing package 
or even a hardware mockup. The existence and continuous 
dissemination of an official, updated source of project 
information that enables all project participants, both new and 
experienced, to share a common vision of the hardware, its 
intended operation, performance requirements, and 
terminology makes it less likely that potential problems and 
warning signs will be overlooked or misunderstood. For 
complex systems it is especially important that everyone have 
a clear, correct, and basic understanding of the entire system 
so they can see how their own detailed knowledge fits into the 
whole. For an engineered system like the SARJ, under 
development at that time, a frequently updated project 
description document would have been appropriate. 
Such a document, however, does not seem to have existed. 
An early design paper written by NASA researchers best 
describes the SARJ mechanism (Ref. 3). This paper, which 
was not widely disseminated, outlined differing conceptual 
design approaches to building large rotary joints. The actual 
SARJ design was certainly influenced by this paper, but there 
were key differences. One difference was that the early 
conceptual design used the rollers to drive the race ring. In 
effect, the rollers push the ring in a circle. The final design 
utilized a gear built into the race that enabled the driven ring 
to push the rollers. This subtle difference prevents the rollers 
from self-aligning like a follower-castor wheel and can lead to 
roller tipping and race-ring pinching (Ref. 5). The conceptual 
design also took a different approach to the use of “lubricants” 
for the rollers. In the original design concept, the rollers were 
intended to drive the ring, and sufficiently high sliding friction 
was thought to be necessary to prevent roller-race slippage 
(Ref. 3). Thus, surface traction materials were suggested that 
could ensure high friction and enduring smooth surfaces as 
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opposed to the low-friction surfaces actually required by the 
SARJ. Had a revised design document been written and shared 
with all participants, some of these more subtle issues may 
have been discussed and addressed. 
 
The absence of an accurate written 
description of the mechanism effectively 
isolated participants working on individual 
elements of the system. Such compart-
mentalizing of participants can reduce project 
time spent answering questions but also 
increases the risk that problems may be 
missed.  
 
Few people involved with the root-cause investigation 
appeared to have an accurate system-level understanding of 
how the SARJ worked. Only through arduous study of the 
build documents and long discussions with various 
participants could one begin to understand the SARJ operating 
characteristics. With such a fragmented approach to system-
level understanding, when questions arose during the failure 
investigation about specific components or subassemblies, the 
team had to rely solely on the input from subject matter 
experts who also could not see the “big picture.” At times, this 
input was incorrect. A prime example was the design intent of 
the gold plating used on the rollers. No written SARJ 
document clearly defined its role as a friction-reducing film, 
and few people involved with the failure investigation were 
even aware that gold could be an effective solid lubricant. This 
was likely true during the SARJ build. Considering the general 
lack of system-level understanding, one can more easily see 
how conditions such as peeling gold films on rollers could 
have been downplayed during the SARJ build period. 
Improving communications so that everyone contributing to 
a project understands their role, the roles of other contributors, 
and how the many pieces of a system work together, leads to 
more robust products. The key step is to make system 
knowledge fully and continuously available to all and provide 
sufficient resources to encourage communications amongst 
personnel at all levels. In today’s more electronic age, this can 
be effectively done with an information-sharing Web site that 
could even include a discussion forum, blogs, the most up-to-
date project description document, and drawing archives. 
Thorough validation, both analytical and experimental, is 
another important area where more extensive effort would 
have been a good investment. There are two primary reasons 
projects conduct validation tests. One is to verify that 
requirements are met. The other is to develop a better 
understanding of how a system performs. Customers willingly 
support tests to prove a system meets requirements. They are 
less likely to spend resources to develop in-depth 
understanding. Such understanding is supposed to be solely a 
function of design. Since design engineers develop their 
concepts and hardware based upon fixed rules and equations, 
it is an understandable view that hardware will obey physics. 
Therefore testing to achieve deeper understanding may appear 
unnecessary. But when “off-nominal” behavior is observed, 
such as higher drive torque than models predict, efforts to 
understand such discrepancies are resources well spent. Even 
if tested operating parameters are within margins, unexpected 
or unexplainable behavior should trigger the need to revisit the 
models, experiments, and design assumptions until closure is 
reached. Otherwise, the models and experimental data are in 
question, and true risks can be more difficult to assess. 
Today, testing can take two forms: analytical testing and 
experimental testing. For simple systems with mild failure 
consequences, one or the other can be sufficient. For instance, 
a hand tool like a screwdriver intended for home use could be 
designed and built with a reliance on modeling and stress 
analysis. Should it fail, because of poor materials or 
workmanship, it can be replaced easily. A similar tool destined 
for use during an EVA outside the ISS would require both 
analytical and experimental testing because failure 
consequences could be dire. The materials used for the tool 
would be proof-tested to verify their yield and ultimate 
strengths. A flightlike completed tool would be tested to 
failure to make sure no sharp pieces could become liberated if 
it were used beyond its limits, lest such debris do harm 
elsewhere.  
 
Although it might be tempting to utilize one 
method of testing only, both analytical 
modeling and experimental validation are 
essential for critical systems. 
 
In the present case, it may have been possible to set up an 
inexpensive experiment to validate the SARJ torque model 
that was based upon analysis (Ref. 9). The model concluded 
that lubrication of the roller-race interface had a negligible 
effect on SARJ torque. This could have easily been verified 
using the structural test article (STA) SARJ, by adding grease 
and monitoring torque. Conversely, an STA test with unplated 
rollers could have been conducted to see how the system 
responded. Unfortunately, analysis was too heavily relied 
upon, making it difficult for engineers to interpret the distress 
signals broadcast by the starboard SARJ during prelaunch 
ground tests. 
If project management advocates extensive testing, it can be 
interpreted as their lack of confidence in the design team. 
Testing is also expensive and typically occurs late in a project 
cycle when resources, both time and money, are in short 
supply. Thus it is not surprising that much testing is aimed at 
proving that a system meets minimum performance metrics, 
plus perhaps some design margin. Testing to establish limits 
and capabilities and testing to intentional failure are rarely 
done except in cases where human life is involved. 
Aircraft design is a field with little room for uncertainty. 
When a new airframe is being developed extensive full-scale 
tests are conducted before the first unit ever leaves the ground 
for a flight test. One key ground test involves static loading of 
the wings. This is usually done using weighted bags of sand. 
First the design load is placed upon the wings and their 
deflection is measured and compared to models. Inspectors are 
present to make sure the response reasonably agrees with the 
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models. Then additional weights are added until the design 
margin—typically twice the rated load—is reached. Again, 
deflection data are compared to that of the models. The tests 
up to this point are a good representation of the tests NASA 
conducted on the SARJ and serve to prove that the design 
meets minimum and margin requirements. Testing of aircraft 
goes further, however. 
After the aircraft is shown to successfully handle the design 
and margin loads, additional weights are added and deflection 
data is collected. Eventually, the wings break in a dramatic 
fashion. At this point the ultimate load capacity, the failure 
mode, and the exact location of the failure are verified. The 
result is then compared to the model results, and any 
discrepancies are explained. Such testing has proven 
invaluable in refining models and developing a database that 
can be used in the event that failure occurs in flight. 
Such intentional failure testing has drawbacks, however. One 
is that the test article is consumed. This can be expensive. 
Additionally, there is programmatic risk. If the test displays an 
unexpected result, albeit under conditions outside the design 
envelope, a redesign may be indicated. This can place more 
pressure on schedule and cost. Another drawback is political. 
Dramatic images of broken hardware can be difficult to explain 
to those outside the team. In our risk adverse times, some feel it 
is better to avoid failures, even those that are planned.  
 
Nonetheless, without a test to intentional 
failure, one cannot verify that the design team 
has accurately predicted the failure mode.  
 
For the SARJ, this is an important lesson to be learned. The 
failure modes identified by the design team included rolling 
contact fatigue of the race ring, wear of the drive gear and 
pinion, foreign object damage (FOD), and failure of the 
internal tapered roller bearings used in each roller. Backup 
bushings and electronic rotation indicators were used to 
monitor the internal bearings. Great care was taken to preclude 
FOD contamination and ultrahard and strong roller, and race 
materials were chosen to push the predicted rolling contact 
fatigue life orders of magnitude beyond ISS needs. A gear life 
test was run to verify pinion-drive gear wear was acceptable. 
For this test, the structural test article (STA) was run at 
heightened speed for an extended time to mimic 13 or more 
years of SARJ duty. It was then inspected for wear. While it 
did show signs of uneven roller loading and wear marks, these 
were not explored further. In effect, the testing that was done 
was aimed at verifying adequate life and margins for those 
failure modes that were predicted. Exploratory testing was not 
conducted to identify unknown failure modes such as roller 
tipping and pinching of the race ring caused by inadequate 
lubrication. Such a subtle failure path would have been 
difficult to predict. It is possible that less purposeful but more 
inquisitive testing of the STA may have revealed such a 
failure mode. 
Among the tests that could have been performed was an 
accelerated life test of the STA in a more flightlike 
environment. The pinion life test was done in air because 
utilizing a vacuum test facility large enough to house the full 
SARJ would have been prohibitively expensive. It is well 
known that the atmosphere heavily influences tribological 
behavior. Friction, for example, is often higher in vacuum than 
in air for bare metal and ceramic interfaces.  
The STA could have also been used to validate some of the 
flight conditions that arose by manufacturing changes and 
errors. For instance, many of the rollers used for the starboard 
SARJ had wavy rather than flat surfaces. The decision to 
accept these rollers was based upon a prediction of their effect 
upon fatigue life, provided a successful short-term system-
level checkout ground test of the SARJ occurred prior to 
launch. The same philosophy applied to the peeling gold films.  
Discussions were held between subcontractors over the 
effects of wavy roller profiles on performance, but the 
resolution, again, was led by analysis and engineering 
judgment rather than experimental verification. Other than the 
short-term prelaunch ground test, which was done in air,  
 
NASA flew hardware in a condition that 
was never fully tested.  
 
The STA could have been reconfigured for such a test 
independent of the build schedule. Anything learned during 
such independent testing, even after launching the flight 
hardware, could have proved valuable. Had such testing led to 
failure, on-orbit greasing of the SARJs could have been done 
without the extensive cleaning, scraping, and trundle 
replacement.  
Other interesting tests could also be envisioned to address 
other scenarios. For example, in a ground test one could 
remove one or more trundles and examine the effect on joint 
stiffness and operation. Rollers could be intentionally locked 
and dragged to see the effects on torque and vibration. If such 
a condition develops on orbit, such ground data can aid in 
deciphering performance anomalies in orbit to better anticipate 
problems. To reiterate, more extensive hardware testing 
provides additional understanding of complex systems and 
should not be undervalued. 
Summary of Results 
The forensic engineering investigation presented in this 
paper identifies missteps that contributed to the SARJ’s 
failure. Some of these missteps were purely technical while 
others were more programmatic. Based upon the factors that 
contributed to the failure and the actions taken to achieve a 
successful on-orbit repair the following conclusions were 
drawn and are reiterated below:  
 
(1) Rolling is better than sliding, oils and greases are better 
than solid lubricants, and traditional solid lubricants (e.g., 
molybdenum disulfide, polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), and 
engineered and intercalated graphite) are better at reducing 
friction than metal films. 
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(2) The best possible design could only have been 
determined through an extensive experimental and analytical 
research and development program since such a mechanism—
the SARJ—was a first of its kind. 
(3) Inadequate lubrication of the roller-race contact combined 
with a kinematic mechanism design vulnerable to roller tipping 
and high friction led to damaging high roller-race surface forces 
and stresses. 
(4) The absence of an accurate written description of the 
mechanism effectively isolated participants working on 
individual elements of the system. Such compartmentalizing of 
participants can reduce project time spent answering questions 
but also increases the risk that problems may be missed. 
(5) Although it might be tempting to utilize one method of 
testing only, both analytical modeling and experimental 
validation are essential for critical systems.  
(6) NASA flew hardware in a condition that was never fully 
tested. 
(7) Despite extensive system analysis and modeling, without 
a test to intentional failure, one cannot verify that the design 
team has accurately predicted the failure mode. 
Concluding Remarks 
NASA’s missions, often the first of their kind, rely upon 
many engineered systems that are unique and complex and 
cannot be fully tested before launch. This was most certainly 
the case for the SARJ mechanisms. This challenges the 
engineering community to develop approaches to incremental 
testing and designs that are inherently robust and redundant. In 
hindsight, one could surmise that the SARJ failure mode could 
have been anticipated, but this is an unrealistic conclusion. 
The SARJ is an unusual mechanism that provides an unusual 
function under unusual conditions. Predicting its failure mode 
without extensive ground testing is unlikely. To enhance the 
chances that such vulnerabilities may be uncovered the 
following recommendations are offered: 
A more comprehensive approach to internal engineering 
communications amongst project participants is essential. 
Teams of people with varying expertise, duties, and 
perspectives undertake large, complex systems such as the 
SARJ. Such projects often span many years and must endure 
changes of leadership and key personnel as well as utilize 
many contractors. To avoid overlooking potential problems, 
each and every contributing participant needs to share a 
common understanding of the engineered system, its function, 
and its design. Once achieved it is more likely that the 
ramifications of a seemingly small manufacturing variance, 
such as gold film adhesion, will be put in the proper context. 
Effective communication could take the form of a living, 
descriptive project overview supplemented by presentations or 
even an electronic clearinghouse or Web site accessible to all. 
Finally, caution must be exercised to avoid reliance upon 
validation through solely analytical modeling or experimental 
testing. To minimize risk, both approaches are needed. Such 
redundant test approaches should yield consistent results. If a 
contradictory answer emerges to a common question, its 
resolution is warranted. In the case of the SARJ, the torque 
analyses suggested that joint drag was independent from the 
lubrication condition of the roller-race interface. When the 
prelaunch ground test yielded higher than expected torque, this 
non-intuitive, analytical conclusion could have been 
experimentally verified. 
Unfortunately, active and comprehensive communications 
requires effort and investment. The insistence upon both 
analytical and experimental testing is also costly. Resource 
constraints often inhibit such investments. Further, the 
redundant approach to testing and intentionally testing beyond 
design conditions to failure can be unpalatable to the very 
parties that have developed the requirements and design 
margins. This makes it even more necessary for project 
leadership to encourage and nurture an open and safe 
environment where everyone questions everything and 
criticisms are welcomed. When the consequences for 
unexpected failure are dire, a thorough approach to testing and 
development is more effective. 
It is hoped that the lessons learned through the SARJ failure 
and recovery will serve as a teaching aid to reduce system 
failures on future projects. 
 
Glenn Research Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Cleveland, Ohio, May 16, 2011 
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